4 equity and ¾ debt financing. 8 These projections are for early planning purposes only. For actual operations, it would be necessary to validate and refine projections through a bottom-up analysis of individual country needs and a compilation of existing project pipelines. Sources: See Annex.
Infrastructure sectors (and investee countries) will vary in terms of their suitability for private equity investment and their ability to sustain market-based interest rates. For example,
• Some sectors have proved attractive to private investors -assuming an appropriate tax, legal, and regulatory environment, including tariffs that allow for cost recovery and an adequate risk-adjusted return on equity -and are more likely to be suitable for private investment, including through public-private partnerships (PPPs). 9 These include mobile telephony, electricity generation (PPPs), airports (PPPs), seaport terminals (PPPs). It is important to note that financing should not be the motive for PPPs. By providing sovereign guarantees, governments can usually obtain financing more cheaply than can private investors. The real motive for PPPs
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• Because electricity transmission is a natural monopoly, private investment in it is often not suitable, unless there is a sound regulatory regime in place.
• Private participation in electricity distribution often takes the form of a management contract, rather than an equity investment.
• Landline telephony can be attractive for private equity investors, but governments often prefer to maintain control of this sector.
• Railways may be profitable, and some roads can be developed as toll roads. In many cases, however, improved transport connectivity may be an externality that cannot readily be monetized.
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• Historically, private investment in water/waste water infrastructure has suffered because tariffs were often too low even to allow for cost recovery. The private sector now is playing more of a role in water purification, but distribution seems likely to remain predominantly public.
Based on these generalizations about sector-specific "bankability," or commercial viability, we also make assumptions about equity allocations between private investors and governments (Table 1) . The source of a government's equity investment in infrastructure might well be a loan from an international financial institution, commercial bank/bank syndicate, or bond offering.
For simplicity, we assume here that governments' equity investments would come from borrowed funds. Thus, for planning purposes, we assume that satisfaction of the $8.3 trillion demand would involve about $1.2 trillion of private equity and $7.1 trillion of project debt or public debt financing.
should be efficiency over the project's entire life cycle, from planning and construction through operations, with the private sector incentivized to deliver efficiency while managing risks. 10 Independent power producers (IPPs) are often established on a build-operate-transfer (BOT) or similar basis.
Airports are often done on a BOT basis. For seaports, an increasingly popular model is for a government port authority to act as landlord, investing in capital dredging and navigation aids, while private operators invest in container or other specialized terminals, often on a BOT basis. 11 For example, an improvement in a road network would likely produce economic efficiency gains. But if the availability of alternative routes precludes establishment of a toll-road, it would not be possible to extract rents for these efficiency gains. The positive externalities of infrastructure (e.g., employment and industrial development) may not be fully appropriated by the infrastructure investor even if there are no alternative routes.
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Supply of infrastructure financing. On the supply side are existing investors ("old money") and potential sources of new money.
Old money. Existing investors include equity investors; bank lenders, either syndicated or solo; and bondholders.
Equity investors now typically feature operators of specialized assets (e.g., power plants, toll roads, air/sea ports), construction firms, and host governments. We assume that Syndicated loans -from, as the term implies, a syndicate of banks rather than a single bank -"are common for the debt-financing of larger projects, as they allow the diversification of the large risks of a single project across a group of banks." Syndication is less likely for smaller infrastructure projects. "That said, syndicated project loans are likely to represent a major share of bank loan financing in terms of the overall volume, given that they are more likely for very large loans."
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Syndicated lending for Asian infrastructure has trended upward since 1990 (Table 2) . (Table 3) .
Thus, the combined infrastructure loans stock for CDB and CCB was at least $2.6 trillion at end-2014. contracts. Also, a constructor may go bankrupt, which results in delay while the project sponsor finds a new constructor. Chul Hum Paik, Macquarie Korea Asset Management Co., Ltd., presentation, 2 June 2015. To compete in this highly competitive sector, construction firms may bid below expected costs and then rely upon contractual change orders to make a profit, a potentially disputatious approach. Arthur Andersen presentation on Channel Tunnel project restructuring, Seoul, Korea, April 1998. 24 Bond financing is, as yet, rare during the construction phase of infrastructure projects. Through construction and perhaps early start up, bank loans are preferable because (i) banks are better able than bond holders to monitor the high-risk construction phase; (ii) bank financing is more flexible and better able to accommodate a gradual disbursement of funds; and (iii) banks can quickly negotiate among each other on debt restructuring, which is relatively more likely during construction due to unforeseen events, whereas restructuring among diverse bondholders tends to be complex and time-consuming. While restructuring could trigger bond defaults, banks can be more flexible in restructuring existing loans. Bonds become more attractive, however, after construction, during a project's operational phase, which can last for decades. Default risks subside rapidly after construction. Because infrastructure projects often have monopoly or quasi-monopoly price-setting power, operating cash flows shown higher volumes in China than in the rest of EMA. China accounts for 85 percent of recent EMA infrastructure-related bond issuances (Table 5) . Bonds are often issued to refinance bank loans for infrastructure projects. While not a good indicator of new infrastructure investment, infrastructure bonds are a mechanism to replenish banks' liquidity and worth developing as a potentially important new asset class. (Table 6 ). These include pension funds and pension fund reserves, insurance companies, investment funds, sovereign wealth funds, and endowments. Since only some investment fund assets are devoted to fixed income, 25 it appears that about $75 trillion is available for long-term debt financing. This is below a $90 trillion estimate from HSBC in 2013.
Despite the large assets, actual allocations for infrastructure are small. For example, as of 2012, allocations for infrastructure debt and equity were put at just 0.5 percent of pension fund assets. The slow flow of private investment funds into EMA infrastructure projects reflects, at least in the eyes of private investors, insufficient returns for the risks assumed. As Table 7 shows, the risks of private participation in infrastructure investment, often through multi-decade PPPs, are many. PPPs typically involve a special purpose vehicle (SPV) that acts as the counterparty within a complex web of contracts that allocate rights, risks, and cash flows among equity sponsors (developers); government allocators of concession rights, purchasers of infrastructure services (e.g., electricity, water), and tariff setters; lenders; insurers; and labor.
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Risks include inter alia design, construction, tariff, operations, currency, interest rate, expropriation, inconvertibility, legal/regulatory/tax change, civil disturbance/war, and natural force majeure. Governments may seek to renegotiate the tariffs upon which project profitability depends. Fixed costs to equity sponsors for acquiring specialized knowledge/relationships and preparing project bids are high. Such costs are even higher in the case of less-advanced jurisdictions lacking a qualified PPP unit that can properly prepare projects for investors' consideration. Equity sponsors may expect 14 -15 percent financial returns in reasonably wellorganized and secure jurisdictions. For less-attractive jurisdictions, the higher financial returns needed to compensate for higher risks might render a project commercially infeasible. In addition to financial risks, the potential for criticism over the quality/cost of infrastructure services or potential environmental damage/social dislocation poses reputational risks for equity sponsors and lenders.
The imbalances shown in Figure 1 likely reflect three binding constraints on rapid satisfaction of EMA's $8.3 trillion infrastructure investment gap: (1) high risks/costs due to inadequate project preparation by EMA governments, too-low tariffs, and legal/regulatory/tax issues; (2) the illiquidity of long-term infrastructure investment; and (3) the difficulty of pricing long-term and illiquid infrastructure investment. Hence, if it follows conventional wisdom and operating patterns at the World Bank and ADB, AIIB's $250 billion of investment capacity is simply too small to achieve a meaningful reduction of EMA's infrastructure investment gap.
II. AIIB Business Issues and Alternatives
The second basic question -how AIIB should deploy its $250 billion of investment capacity to catalyze much larger financial flows from Old Money and New Money sources -raises many follow-on questions:
1. Should AIIB focus only on obtaining adequate risk-adjusted returns, and simply accept whatever development results from that? Or should AIIB also pursue development through concessional lending for non-bankable projects, similar to the The below discussion elaborates upon these issues and alternatives for AIIB Governors to consider.
A. Goals
Observers have speculated on AIIB's fundamental purpose, many noting that AIIB's middle name is "investment" rather than "development." The Agreement actually emphasizes development, wealth creation, and improved connectivity through investment in infrastructure and other productive sectors.
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Article 2 on AIIB functions lists (i) "investment . . . for development purposes"; (ii) "special regard to the needs of less developed members"; (iii) "to encourage private investment . . . and to supplement private capital when private capital is not available"; and (iv) to undertake such other activities and provide such other services as may further these functions."
Thus, it appears that AIIB will need quickly to develop two investment streams: one that earns an adequate risk-adjusted return, and a second that provides concessional financing for economically viable but commercially non-bankable projects. As estimated earlier (Table 1) , perhaps 25 percent of EMA's infrastructure investment needs will be for road, water, and sanitation projects of doubtful bankability.
The Agreement distinguishes between AIIB operations undertaken (i) with AIIB's own equity and borrowing ("Ordinary Resources") and (ii) with funds accepted for AIIB's use in consistency with the Agreement's purposes and functions ("Special Funds"). Special Funds could include concessional financing pools of contributions from AIIB members and others as well as eventual profit contributions from AIIB.
This has been the model for IDA, which now follows a 3-year replenishment cycle. An AIIB initiative to develop a concessional lending arm would create serious competition for IDA.
Governments that may have felt alienated from the existing international financial institutions framework." 32 Learning from the experience of existing IFIs, an AIIB trust fund framework would do well manage TF transaction costs by avoiding donor-specific TFs in favor of multidonor TFs, controlling the frequency and extent of donor reporting, and discouraging tied TFs.
B. Project Investment vs. Asset Class Development
But what is an appropriate target for AIIB's efforts to earn an adequate risk-adjusted return on its non-concessional investments? It is widely assumed that AIIB will focus its investment capacity (some combination of loans, equity, and guarantees) solely on new "greenfield" infrastructure projects or "other productive sectors." 33 In addition to providing needed physical investments, if it helps to harmonize contractual structures, regulatory frameworks, and data available for due diligence, AIIB's direct involvement in infrastructure projects could serve to reduce risks/costs for equity sponsors.
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An interesting question, however, is whether AIIB should also invest in existing infrastructure debt and equity in order to reduce constraints on larger financial flows from Old
Money and New Money investors. "Infrastructure equity or debt investors face two simultaneous issues: (i) long-term commitments of financial resources to an investment which is typically not liquid, and (ii) an inherent difficulty to price the associated long-term risks.
Traditional financing instruments, such as direct equity stakes or bank loans, force investors to deal with these two problems at the same time." Financial instruments such as bonds or infrastructure funds, however, could provide liquidity and help price long-term risks. This should make long-term financing more attractive to institutional investors. In addition, such financial instruments could "make infrastructure an asset class more accessible to a broader group of investors. In this regard, it helps to diversify the large risks of infrastructure projects across many groups of investors. In addition, the vast resources of capital market, which are currently hardly tapped by infrastructure projects, are much more accessible with a broader mix of financial instruments. Infrastructure bonds and infrastructure funds carry a high potential."
32 Article 16. 33 The Agreement also allows for investment in "other productive sectors." These might include, for instance, in cement and other building materials, which could save on transport costs of importing. 34 "A key obstacle to the emergence of infrastructure as an asset class is the heterogeneity in the setup of projects and the lack of readily available data." Ehlers, 2014.
Better diversification of risk "is highly desirable, as infrastructure risks are currently shouldered to a large extent by the banking sector, and the public sector through guarantees." There is "high potential" in infrastructure funds, which could invest among a wide range of infrastructure projects in order to diversify and reduce overall risk. " increase the stock of more-liquid infrastructure bonds that could more readily be priced. Such bond issuances could form the basis for infrastructure bond funds. AIIB could also trade in infrastructure equity and develop infrastructure equity funds.
AIIB could commence Capital Market Operations relatively quickly. This would enable AIIB to make a near-term contribution to infrastructure investment, while AIIB develops its capacity for direct project investment and sorts out difficult environmental/social safeguard issues. If it manages infrastructure bond and equity funds itself, 36 AIIB could also earn management fees.
C. Portfolio Allocation
This section discusses possible AIIB allocations among equity investments, debt investments, and guarantees.
35 Ehlers, 2014. 36 Arguments can be made for AIIB to manage at least some such funds itself. On the other hand, AIIB might choose to outsource fund management in order to conserve in-house capacity for direct investment in infrastructure projects. To be effective as a direct equity investor, AIIB would need the staff capacity to monitor projects, especially during the most-risky planning and construction phases.
The Agreement specifies that AIIB "shall seek to maintain reasonable diversification in its investments in equity capital." Moreover, AIIB "shall not assume responsibility for managing any entity or enterprise in which it has an investment and shall not seek a controlling interest in the entity or enterprise concerned, except where necessary to safeguard [its] investment."
An 8 percent equity allocation split into small equity investments 39 seems a highly desirable way for AIIB to mobilize additional equity, and thereby address one of the biggest 37 Ehlers, 2014. As noted earlier, equity investors now typically feature operators of specialized assets (e.g., power plants, toll roads, air/sea ports), construction firms, and host governments. Financial institution equity investment is rare.
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binding constraints on infrastructure investment. The ability of AIIB to invest in equity gives it an advantage over the World Bank, which is practically precluded from equity investments.
Debt investments may include loans in the form of senior or subordinated debt, or bond holdings.
As noted earlier, bank loans (individual or syndicated) are especially important through the early construction phase, because of the superior flexibility and monitoring capacity of banks.
Marginal default rates for project finance loans have been found to peak by Year 2. Over ten years, however, project loans may actually be safer than junk bonds. 40 Expected risk premiums decline sharply over the life of infrastructure projects.
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AIIB could catalyze debt financing at several points in the project life cycle. For example,
• At least through the construction phase, AIIB could attract institutional investors by splitting project debt into two tranches: senior debt with an A-minus credit rating or higher, which can be issued as a bond to capital market buyers, and subordinate debt financed by AIIB.
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• After construction, AIIB could manage the refinancing of project bank loans with bonds, probably at a lower rate, which could also be sold on capital markets. Long-term bonds rated Ba or higher should be of interest to institutional investors with long-term liabilities, such as pension funds and life insurance companies, while banks reliant on short-term 40 Marginal default rates for project finance loans peak by Year 2 at about 1.5-1.8 percent, and then decline below 0.6 percent by Year 7. Over ten years, cumulative default rates for project finance loans have been about 8-9 percent, higher than for Baa-rated corporate loans (5 percent) but lower than for Ba-rated corporate loans (20 percent). Moody's Investor Service, "Infrastructure Default and Recovery Rates, 1983 -2012H1, Special Comment," December 2012, cited in Ehlers, 2014. Thus, project finance loans seem safer than "junk" debt, defined Ba-rated or lower. 41 At one infrastructure fund, expected risk premiums (above a risk-free rate) are 8-10 percent during initiation, 6-8 percent during construction, 3-6 percent during growth, and 2-3 percent during maturity. C.H. Paik, Macquarie Korea Asset Management, 2015. These are, of course, for "bankable" projects. 42 "The European Commission and European Investment Bank (EIB) have initiated an effort . . . . to take advantage of the appetite of capital markets for long-term debt instruments with an A-minus credit rating or higher. The EIB scheme works by splitting the debt into two tranches; "senior debt" with an A credit rating and "subordinate debt" with a BBB credit rating. The senior debt can be sold on the capital market as a project bond (because it fulfills the rating requirements institutional bond buyers) while the subordinate debt is financed by EIB. In essence, the program will take on the role traditionally played by monolines -credit enhancement companies that were swept out of the market in the financial crisis." McKinsey, 2013. deposit-based funding would such refinancing. There is "enormous" potential in postconstruction bond refinancing. But any such initiative will need to be accompanied by efforts to develop local bond markets. 43 Because an AIIB member considered as a "less developed country" has the option to pay half of its subscription in its own currency,
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AIIB may find it easier to support the development of local bond markets.
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Guarantees. Debt investors may also require guarantees to reduce the expected costs of default to an acceptable level. Guarantees may address credit or non-commercial risk. 46 For large infrastructure projects, guarantee risks are often shared among a large number of development agencies. Guarantees are an efficient way for development agencies to leverage their investment capacity. 47 The Agreement also allows AIIB to guarantee, "as primary or secondary obligor, in whole or in part, loans for economic development." Its Governors may
wish to decide whether AIIB should provide credit guarantees, as well as guarantees against noncommercial risks. Whole guarantees are questionable, especially for credit risk, on moral hazard grounds.
AIIB's Ordinary Resources portfolio will likely reflect a desire by its Governors for AIIB to maintain a AAA credit rating. Within that constraint, investments in infrastructure equity, 43 The potential is enormous, because of lower default risk, positive cash flows, and strong (and possibly monopolistic) pricing power of infrastructure projects. A key question is how to promote infrastructure bonds in emerging markets. Because infrastructure bonds are typically issued in local currencies, to minimize potential currency mismatches, "the development of local bond markets is a prerequisite for issuing infrastructure bonds." Ratings and local bond market development may be constrained by legal frameworks, bureaucratic efficiency, and contract enforceability. Such initiatives as public/private local bond funds and bond insurance could help. While international capital markets could be another option, higher disclosure standards -including the Regulation S disclosure standard limited to investors outside the U.S., or 144A standard that would provide access to U. 
D. Asset Management
The Agreement's Article 17 provisions on Special Funds seem also to allow for AIIB to manage funds from long-term institutional investors, such as pension funds, insurance companies, and sovereign wealth funds.
If, as suggested earlier, the Governors conclude that development of infrastructure finance as an asset class is as important as development of individual projects, AIIB could allocate half of its investment capacity to co-invest in existing assets with institutional investors.
Acting as the General Partner, AIIB could establish and manage various instrument-specific Limited Partnerships (LPs) -e.g., Asia Infrastructure Equity I, and Asia Infrastructure Bonds Ion behalf of its limited partners. Because infrastructure is an under-developed asset class, AIIB should be prepared to invest as much as 5 percent in early-stage LPs. This would align incentives between AIIB and institutional investors. Thus, $125 billion from AIIB might attract an additional $2,375 billion from institutional investors, 49 for total LP assets under management (AUM) of $2,500 billion. If it manages such funds rather than outsourcing to external fund managers, 50 AIIB would earn management fees, some of the profits from which could go toward funding concessional lending, indicated earlier as the other main use seen for Special Funds. 48 In particular higher returns from equity and subordinated debt, and the potential of equity, subordinated debt, bonds, and guarantees to leverage larger financial flows from institutional investors. 49 I.e., about 4 percent of $57 trillion in pension fund, insurance company, and sovereign wealth fund assets as of
2013.
50 See footnote 30.
23
Most importantly, co-investment is a way both (i) to leverage AIIB's resources to a level more commensurate with Asia's infrastructure gap and (ii) to develop infrastructure finance as an asset class.
E. Greenfield Business Development
IFI-financed infrastructure projects often proceed via a "top-down" process. As a result of what may be an extended preliminary dialogue, multiple visiting missions, and pre-feasibility and feasibility studies, the IFI and its sovereign government counterpart may agree to pursue a potential infrastructure project. Especially if the government is the sole equity sponsor, with the IFI as lender, there usually then follows a public tender process of six months or more to issue a construction contract(s). If the project involves private financing, additional time will be needed for the selected equity sponsor to get organized and arrange private debt financing. In either case, this is a labor-intensive process of many months (e.g., 12 -36) for the IFI, who may be called upon to liaise with the government counterpart, equity sponsor, and commercial lenders on project design and feasibility, debt financing, legal/regulatory/tax issues, risk management and guarantees, and environmental and social safeguards.
Especially as AIIB will have to build its own capacity while it seeks efficiencies, AIIB may want to explore an alternative: a decentralized "bottom up" approach to greenfield business development. AIIB could, for instance, encourage infrastructure project principals 51 to approach AIIB with nearly complete investment packages to which AIIB could add a critical financing component. 52 Such an alternative bottom up approach might be less demanding in terms of AIIB's time and staff capacity. For this alternative to work well, however, AIIB might need to liaise with capable PPP units, cultivate the development of other PPP units, and market this approach to potential equity sponsors, especially experienced infrastructure operators and construction firms.
F. Safeguards
51 E.g., the sovereign government, construction firm, and perhaps other lenders for purely public procurement via an EPC contract; or equity sponsors, sovereign government, and other lenders for a PPP. 52 E.g., a small equity stake, or a subordinated debt tranche, or a partial risk guarantee.
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The assumed breakout of infrastructure investment needs (Table 1) Stung by criticism at environmental destruction and social dislocation from some of the projects it funded, the World Bank began in the 1980s to develop a wide variety of safeguards, Because the World Bank's thresholds for equivalence and acceptability were too high, the country systems approach was little used and soon faded away. In 2010, the World Bank piloted another new approach, "program for results," which disburses for agreed development results rather than to pay for project inputs (e.g., construction). Agreed development results may include environmental and social outcomes. 55 For projects deemed to pose higher risks, however, traditional safeguards would still apply. 53 The power of "eminent domain" refers to the state's power to take private property for public interest with a just compensation to the property owner, and provides a legal and philosophical basis for balancing economic development with protecting individual rights. On controversies over eminent domain, see Ilya Somin (2015) Perhaps it is possible to implement the same safeguards more efficiently. But major efficiency gains seem unlikely. More likely perhaps is the possibility that AIIB will avow the same principles for environmental/social protection, but that actual implementation will be more favorable toward infrastructure development.
While its Governors grapple with safeguards, AIIB can nonetheless make a rapid start on useful investment activity. This could include less-risky projects, projects in jurisdictions with good country systems, and Capital Market Operations to support development of infrastructure finance as a recognized asset class. These could provide early wins for AIIB.
G. Country Allocations
Some Governors may worry that AIIB will become a tool for Beijing to implement its "One Belt -One Road" (OBOR) program, to the disadvantage of other potential borrowers.
Any such concern seems overstated for several reasons. One is that OBOR and AIIB's operating area are almost identical. 59 Second, AIIB Members can (and should) be expected to ensure that each Member gets a reasonable share of AIIB's investments. As part of this, each
Governor and Director will want early reviews and inputs into AIIB's strategy, plans, and annual work programs. Lastly, in case of severe disagreement between Beijing's and other Members' preferred allocations for AIIB investments, Beijing has other bilateral entities (e.g., CDB, Silk Road Fund) that it can use to pursue its own ends.
58 These likely include the West's failure to give Beijing shares in the Bretton Woods institutions commensurate with China's growth; Beijing's natural desire to have "its own" development bank, as Japan has with ADB; and desires for an additional funding mechanism for One Belt -One Road. 59 There seems to be no precise definition of the geographical scope of OBOR. But we assume that notable outliers include such jurisdictions as Brunei Darussalam and various Pacific island-states. In any case, these jurisdictions represent less than 5 percent of the combined GDPs for AIIB's likely investees.
In any case, the Governors will early on want to approve country-specific investment limits, to avoid portfolio concentration risk.
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III. Recommendations
Thus, its operating environment suggests five main recommendations for AIIB during its first five years of business.
First, AIIB should rapidly develop a concessional financing arm, with reasonable graduation thresholds and differentiated interest rates to facilitate orderly exit from aid. Perhaps $2 billion of Asia's infrastructure needs are in un-bankable sectors.
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Second, AIIB should invest equally in new infrastructure projects and financial instruments for existing infrastructure projects. These existing financial instruments would include bank loans (which could be converted into bonds) and equity for infrastructure projects.
Either type of instrument could be packaged into infrastructure debt or equity funds. Such
Capital Market Operations by AIIB would provide liquidity and allow pricing for long-term infrastructure investments. The purpose would be to develop infrastructure finance as a distinct asset class and draw more New Money from institutional investors into financing infrastructure projects.
Third, AIIB's direct investments in new infrastructure projects should focus on equity, subordinated debt, and guarantees rather than senior debt. The assumption here is that the availability of senior debt from banks is not a binding constraint (or, at least, less of a constraint than other factors) and that AIIB could utilize its balance sheet more effectively by directly providing equity (so as to be better able to address legal/regulatory/tax/institutional impediments, subordinated debt (to raise the senior debt to investment grade so that institutional investors can 60 Such limits may consider various factors, including a percentage (e.g., 10 percent) of AIIB's subscribed capital, reserves, and unallocated surplus; population and GDP; credit risk ratings; covariance; portfolio distribution among risk categories; and any arrears. For examples, see "Information Statement: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development," 16 September 2014, pp. 36 -37. 61 This amount focuses on sector requirements in Table 1 . This is an approximation at best. A proper calculation of concessional financing needs would need to apply country-based criteria for concessional financing to countryspecific projections of infrastructure investment needs. Such a calculation is beyond the scope of this note.
invest), and partial risk guarantees (to provide additional cover and comfort for other debt and equity investors).
Fourth, AIIB should organize itself to attract major co-investments from pension funds, insurance companies, and sovereign wealth funds. This might mean that AIIB would invest 5 percent alongside these institutional investors. The purpose would be to align AIIB's interests with such institutional investors and induce them to invest the other 95 percent in standalone debt or equity funds. An ideal outcome would be for $125 billion of AIIB co-investment to mobile an additional $2.375 trillion from such long-term institutional investors.
Fifth, AIIB should explore a de-centralized bottom-up approach to greenfield project development, whereby equity sponsors and prospective borrowers could bring a nearly complete project to which AIIB could add a necessary financing component (e.g., a minority equity investment, subordinated debt, partial risk guarantees). The intent would be to streamline AIIB's business development operations and economize on the use of AIIB staff.
These five recommendations represent a departure from conventional practice at MDBs.
It remains to be seen how AIIB's Governors will actually address environmental and social safeguards. To this amount, we subtract an estimated amount for countries in the ADB study that are not AIIB PFMs, 63 and add an estimated amount for AIIB PFMs and likely investees who were not included in the ADB study. 64 These adjustments give equal weight to nations' 2009 GDP, 2009 population, and land mass.
A meaningful reduction in
We update this adjusted amount for inflation to express investment requirements in 2015 dollars.
65
The resulting revised projected total requirement of $14.362 trillion is then allocated between China and other EMA. Based on China's shares of GDP, population, and land mass (all equally weighted), we assume the following split of requirements: $5.027 trillion (35 percent) for China and $9.335 trillion (65 percent) for other EMA. Although large, these amounts are not inconsistent with a McKinsey's projection that the world will need $57 trillion in infrastructure investment between 2013 and 2030.
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For China, we find a total of $2.259 trillion in 2010 -2015 debt finance in syndicated loans, loans from China Development Bank and China Construction Bank, and from the World Bank and ADB. To this we add a small equity component based on an assumption that such infrastructure projects in China are financed 10 percent equity and 90 percent debt. 67 In addition to this resulting total, we assume that the Government finances an equivalent amount of smaller infrastructure projects from its own budget, without any external debt or equity financing. From this, it appears to us that China has fulfilled its need for new infrastructure investment as of mid-2015, but will of course need to continue investing to replace older infrastructure. This 62 ADB and ADB Institute, Infrastructure for a Seamless Asia, 2009. Using the Fay and Yepes (2003) methodology, ADB/ADBI calculated (i) additional physical infrastructure requirements for each sector based on GDP per capita, agriculture and manufacturing shares of GDP, urbanization, and population density, (ii) costs for new physical infrastructure at best-practice unit costs, and (iii) replacement of old infrastructure as a share of new infrastructure requirements -2 percent for energy and transport, 8 percent for telecommunications, and 3 percent for water and sanitation -to project total investment needs for major infrastructure sectors. For other EMA, against a project infrastructure need of $9.335 trillion, we find up to $0.381 trillion in debt financing in the form of syndicated loans and loans from CDB and the World Bank and ADB. We assume that EMA projects would be less leveraged, and operate on 25 percent equity and 75 percent debt. 71 To the resulting estimate of $0.508 trillion, we add an equivalent amount for smaller infrastructure projects assumed to be financed by governments from their own budgets without any external debt or equity financing. This suggests 2010 -2015 infrastructure investments in other EMA of $1.016 and a remaining infrastructure investment requirement of about $8.3 trillion.
To this total, we apply ADB's earlier findings about sector specific requirements. We also assume varying levels of equity/debt depending on sector characteristics.
The calculations here do not include infrastructure bonds, as bonds are typically not used for initial construction but rather for re-financing the bank loans that typically finance infrastructure construction. This is a rough back-of-the-envelope calculation. Any skeptical reader may wish to do her/his own calculation.
Our calculation is intended only to approximate magnitudes for AIIB's operating environment.
Operational planning for AIIB or any other investor would require careful bottom-up analyses, using current information, of specific infrastructure sectors in individual countries and compilation of data on project pipelines. 
